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An analysis of current international events

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How Can U.S. Contribute to a UN Peace in Asia?

Two months after the invasion of the Republic of Korea by North Korean forces the outcome of the struggle in the "hermit kingdom" still hangs in the balance, both on the military and on the ideological planes. Nor is it yet certain whether the Korean war will remain a local conflict or, fanned into a large-scale Asian war, will engulf Europe and the United States. During this critical period, however, several basic issues of policy have been clarified at Lake Success, as well as in the capitals of members of the United Nations, and new trends have developed in the global controversy over democracy and communism.

Victory for UN

The August battle of words around the Security Council table under the presidency of Russian Delegate Jacob A. Malik has so dominated public discussions and television screens that there is great danger it will obscure the resulting victory—a victory not for any one country but for the United Nations over the claims of clashing nationalisms. On the one hand Mr. Malik, doubling in the roles of Russian delegate and president of an international agency, prevented the Council from taking further action on Korea but failed in his efforts to expunge from the record far-reaching decisions adopted during his "walkout." On the other hand General Douglas MacArthur, doubling in his roles of American military leader and commander of UN forces in Korea, succeeded in creating a potentially dangerous rift among UN members about Formosa but failed to impose his Formosa policy on either his own government or on the United Nations.

The United States made a significant contribution to this United Nations victory by readily agreeing to place on the Council's agenda Peiping's two complaints—concerning American action on Formosa and the alleged attack by one or more American planes on Manchurian territory. The Truman Administration thereby gave concrete evidence that when it decided on June 25 to act in Korea under the aegis of the United Nations, it accepted UN jurisdiction not merely in a case where its own interests coincided with those of the UN but also on issues where its policy or actions may be challenged by other nations. President Truman in his September 1 "Report to the Nation" confirmed the new attitude indicated by American Delegate Warren R. Austin at the August 29 and 31 sessions of the Security Council when he said: "We believe in the United Nations. When we ratified its Charter, we pledged ourselves to seek peace and security through this world organization. We kept our word when we went to the support of the United Nations in Korea two months ago. We shall never go back on that pledge."

It is true that in 1945 the United States, contrary to its decision in 1919, vigorously furthered the creation of the United Nations. But during the past five years American policy, like that of other member nations, had vacillated between lip-service to the UN and reversion to unilateral action in world affairs. By contrast, since the outbreak of war in Korea, this country has repeatedly demonstrated a determination to mesh its policy with the objectives and needs of the United Nations. This determination has already produced a far more favorable impression on world opinion than reams of American propaganda.

Post-War Aims of U.S.

American action on Korea, however, will be judged in the light of the ultimate goals the United States may pursue, not only in Asia but throughout the world. President Truman showed keen realization of universal concern about "post-war aims" when he declared that this country does not want the Korean conflict to expand into a general war and does not believe in aggressive or preventive war—thus firmly disposing of belligerent talk that had long been emanating from military circles but was finally brought into the open by Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews. He put the onus in advance on "Communist imperialism" if "other armies and other governments" are drawn "into the fight of the aggressors against the United Nations."

The President's speech, reinforcing and expanding Mr. Austin's statements on Formosa in the Security Council, has markedly improved the position of the United States both in Europe and Asia. For until then even our best friends abroad had been wondering uneasily whether the Truman Administration would allow itself to be catapulted by adventurous military advisers into dangerous decisions about Formosa. There have been fears that such action on the

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part of the United States would drag other UN nations into a third world war for which, as the events of the past two months have made abundantly clear, even the advanced nations of Western Europe are unprepared.

Particularly heartening to the Atlantic pact nations is the President's assurance that the United States does not believe in aggressive or preventive war. Hitherto, sensational statements by some American political and military leaders about ready use of the atomic bomb against Russia and the destructiveness of this "absolute weapon" had caused most Europeans to fear rather than welcome the prospect of American military aid. During the past five years the United States, until 1949 sole possessor of the atomic bomb, was also the only country where influential spokesmen uttered threats of atomic warfare. These threats are believed by many here, and by some abroad, notably Winston Churchill, to have deterred the U.S.S.R. from aggression in Europe. Whether or not they did remains a moot point, depending on one's estimate of the Kremlin's strategy. Where our claims about the "absoluteness" of the atomic bomb proved most effective was in frightening the American people into a state of nervous tension which now menaces our common sense and traditional freedoms. They also paralyzed the will to resist of Europeans, who felt themselves doomed whatever might be the outcome of the impending war.

Our overemphasis on the horrors of atomic warfare and our steadfast insistence on having the UN consider control of the bomb apart from and ahead of other, "conventional," weapons, offered the Kremlin a made-to-order opportunity to stampede frightened people everywhere into signing the Stockholm "peace petition" for the outlawing of atomic war and the destruction of bomb stockpiles. It is significant that since the outbreak of war in Korea much less has been heard here about the use of atomic bombs. And some Americans have begun to wonder whether it would not be wise for this country to urge control of all weapons, not of the bomb alone, and thus place Russia's land forces, vastly superior to the forces of the Atlantic coalition, on the United Nations docket.

Queries About U.S.

Although reassured by President Truman's September 1 address, other nations are watching us closely on three major issues. First, our friends both in Europe and Asia want to know whether civilians here will succeed in maintaining control of foreign policy, as the President unhesitatingly did in the MacArthur incident, or will ultimately succumb to military pressures supported by some of the Administration's political opponents. Second, in Asia our friends are asking what we intend to do about remnants of Western colonial rule and the development of nonindustrialized areas. In the heat of conflict with Russia and communism it is often thought strange that the Asian peoples should find any fault with the United States. Yet Filipino Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, president of the UN General Assembly in 1949, declared in the *New York Times Magazine* of September 3 that "as things now stand, most of the free peoples of Asia are wary both of the Western powers and of the Soviet Union." This situation, he contends, is due to the West's reluctance, after World War II, to apply the Atlantic Charter in Asia; and to the half-heartedness of long-promised economic aid—a half-heartedness emphasized by the meagerness of Point Four appropriations as compared with appropriations for military purposes. Many Asian leaders fear that American preoccupation with the Far East is due more to strategic considerations in the struggle with Russia than to concern for the welfare of Asian peoples.

Third, both our European and Asian friends are anxious to discover the attitude of the majority of Americans toward political and economic freedoms in a fast-changing world. Russia's recent actions in world affairs, which even in the opinion of some fervent Communists spell old-fashioned imperialism, have weakened the influence of the U.S.S.R. and to some extent of communism as well. What, however, many ask, will be the alternative in countries which have not yet developed traditions of democracy? Does the United States expect such countries to take over unquestioningly its political and economic institutions? And how well do these institutions work today in the United States?

Leading Europeans and Asians realize all too well from their own experience how difficult it is for democracy to withstand the test of external and internal dangers. But, they ask, is liberalism really an integral part of American life, or is it a thin veneer concealing attitudes of intolerance toward nonconformism on controversial issues frighteningly reminiscent of the attitudes Americans have denounced on the part of Germans, Japanese and Russians? In the past few months such phenomena as the condemnation of individuals without judicial trial, demands for purges of universities, radio and television, and public "confessions" by ex-Communists have raised serious doubts among observers in other nations as to the steadfastness of American democracy. Is American liberalism a fair-weather doctrine to be jettisoned the moment storm signals go up? Is suppression of nonconformism the kind of ideology the United States is urging other nations to endorse?

Some of us may regard such questions as unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs. While the United Nations Charter specifically excludes domestic affairs from the jurisdiction of the interna-

FPA Bookshelf

Recent Books on Britain

The Grand Alliance, by Winston S. Churchill. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950. $6.

The third volume of Mr. Churchill's war memoirs spans the year 1941 and chronicles such epic events as Rudolph Hess's flight to Britain, the loss of Crete, the sinking of the Bismarck, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the drafting of the Atlantic Charter and Pearl Harbor. The former Prime Minister is forthright, blunt and often controversial—but always interesting.

Assignment to Austerity: An American Family in Britain, by Herbert and Nancie Matthews. New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. $3.

The former chief of *The New York Times* London bureau and his English-born wife have produced a readable, human account of post-war Britain and its Labor government. The book includes an analysis of last February's election results, which Mr. Matthews views as a serious defeat for the Labor party.

The English Middle Classes, by Roy Lewis and Angus Maude. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. $3.75.

A study of the impact of war, socialism and the growth of the welfare state on the British middle classes. The authors, themselves members of the group they are analyzing, strive for and achieve notable objectivity, but perhaps because of the difficulty of defining their subject, their conclusions seem groping and vague.

The Decline and Fall of British Capitalism, by Keith Hutchison. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. $3.50.

A perceptive economic history of Britain in the twentieth century which analyzes the forces, among them extensive government planning of two world wars, that brought the Labor party to power in 1945. Mr. Hutchison, who brings his story up to 1950, sees the 1945 election as a turning point "from a society which was still essentially capitalistic, although tempered by many socialist innovations, to one basically socialist despite many capitalist survivals."

tional organization, UN debates have made it increasingly clear that it is difficult to draw a clear line between domestic and foreign policy. This country's capacity to exercise leadership in the non-totalitarian world depends directly on the answers the majority of the American people will give on the major issues of our times. A trend toward totalitarian practices here will revive the prospects of communism; a trend back to firm defense of the practices, and not only the slogans, of democracy will speed the decline of Communist influence. It would be the height of tragic irony if, while calling on other nations to fight for freedom in Korea, we should lose the fight on the home front. VERA MICHELES DEAN

Washington Steers Careful Course on Formosa Issue

The decision of the UN Security Council on August 29 to investgate the Formosan question places that island in the forefront of world attention. In dealing with this delicate issue the Truman Administration has had to steer a difficult course between treacherous alternatives. Total abandonment of Formosa might endanger our military security and threaten the Administration's domestic political position; but augmented support for the Nationalist regime might antagonize such potential allies as India and precipitate open hostilities with the Chinese Communists.

A Thorn in the Flesh

The island of Formosa has never been a territory of intrinsic importance in world politics. Since the sixteenth century when Portuguese adventurers, landing on its mountainous eastern shores, named it the beautiful island — *Ilha Formosa* — it has been chiefly important as a thorn in the flesh of China.

The Chinese themselves had never shown much interest in the Camphor Island, with its Indonesian ties and coastal trade. Consequently the Dutch in 1630, having been driven from China's ports, encountered no resistance in building a fort on Formosa from which they harassed Portuguese trade between Japan and Macao. But the Dutch stay came to a violent end when the island suddenly intruded into Chinese history by providing a refuge for the Ming resistance to the Manchu conquerors. When Koxinga, the Chinese leader, established his stronghold on Formosa in 1661, he set a precedent for the Nationalist retreat of 1949.

The Ming resistance continued for twenty years before the Manchus finally reduced the island, for the first time, to the direct control of Peking. The Chinese, who called the island Taiwan—place of tablelands and streams, descriptive of the western plains—now commenced a steady migration, establishing peasant rice-culture and pushing the aborigines into the high eastern mountains. The Chinese population had grown to 2.6 million by 1896 and 6 million by 1950.

In the nineteenth century various powers occupied or blockaded Taiwan's chief ports as a means of coercing Peking: the British in 1868, the Japanese in 1874 and the French in 1884. In 1895, following the Sino-Japanese war, the island was transferred to Japanese sovereignty, although the new masters had to suppress a local nationalist republic before they could enforce their rule.

China, however, never accepted the permanent alienation of the island, and at Cairo on December 1, 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek agreed that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."

Subsequently at the Potsdam conference the United States, Britain and China declared that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." Following the Japanese surrender, the Chinese took over administration of the island pending formal transfer of sovereignty by a peace treaty with Japan.

The victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland and the retreat of the Nationalists created a new and perplexing problem for the United States. The moral obligation to turn Formosa over to the Peiping regime upon its recognition was clear, but a delay might be sought pending the signing of the Japanese peace treaty. Moreover, Cairo promised Formosa to the "Republic of China," and the new regime, having renounced all Nationalist government treaty obligations, might also be deemed to have forfeited treaty benefits.*

A Policy Reversal?

Following a prolonged debate, President Truman on January 5 proclaimed that the United States had no "predatory designs" on Formosa and would not "interfere in the present situation." When the Korean war broke out, however, President Truman on June 27 announced that he had "ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . . The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

Whether this proclamation heralded a reversal of policy depended on the way in which it was to be implemented. The advocates of all-out aid for the Nationalists were quick to hail every sign of increased American support for Chiang as evidence of a drastic policy change. Following consultations with General Douglas MacArthur in Taiwan, Generalissimo Chiang announced on August 2 that agreement had been reached on all problems discussed, and that "our struggle against Communist aggression will certainly result in final victory."

These developments were welcomed by some observers, who stressed the great military value of the island itself and the usefulness of the Nationalists as an anti-Communist force. Others, however, noted that while the chief strength of the American position in Korea was its United Nations support, the reinforcement of Taiwan was a unilateral action. Should the Chinese Communists attack the island, nations—such as India and Britain—which have recognized the Peiping regime, would probably consider it part of a civil war rather than an act of aggression. A military struggle between the United States and the Chinese Communists would be far more dangerous than the current war in Korea. Moreover, whatever sentiments of a Titoist character might exist in China would indubitably be weakened by forcing Peiping into open hostilities with this country. Finally, these critics doubted if, even from a military point of view, Formosa would be essential to American defense. These considerations were brought into sharp focus by mordant criticisms of United State policy appearing in the press of Britain and France as well as of India and other Asian countries.

* For discussion of the chief alternative policies and the economic situation in Formosa see *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, December 23 and 30, 1949.

UN Inquiry

At this point quick action was forced by two documents: Chinese Communist Foreign Minister and Premier Chou En-lai's complaint to the UN regarding American action on Formosa, and General Douglas MacArthur's message defending a strong policy to safeguard Taiwan. The President's decision on Formosa had already been made before he saw a copy of the MacArthur statement. He authorized Warren R. Austin, United States representative in the UN, to counter the letter from Chou En-lai with a declaration welcoming an investigation of the Formosa question. Senator Austin declared that "the action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces of Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . We have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States." The letter made it clear that the United States did not wish to underwrite the Chiang Kai-shek regime. It affirmed that Formosa's "legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future." If Peiping could hope to win the island at a conference table, it might be reluctant to commit vast numbers of men and costly equipment to a battle with the Seventh Fleet, even if such a course—as some have assumed—would serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

When the President, a few hours later, read the MacArthur message, he promptly ordered its withdrawal—too late to prevent publication. Lest there be any possible misunderstanding, however, the President went on to assert, on August 31, that the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn from Formosa when the Korean conflict had been settled. The next day in his radio "Report to the Nation" he said: "We do not want Formosa or any part of Asia for ourselves. We believe that the future of Formosa, like that of any other territory in dispute, should be settled peacefully. We believe that it should be settled by international action, and not by the decision of the United States or any other state alone. The mission of the Seventh Fleet is to keep Formosa out of the conflict. Our purpose is peace, not conquest." As a further bid to the Chinese Communists to avoid military action, the President said: "We hope in particular that the People of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United Nations and against the American people, who have always been and still are their friends. Only the Communist imperialism, which has already started to dismember China, could gain from China's involvement in the war. The Communist imperialists are the only ones who can gain if China moves into this fight." The same day in the Security Council the United States agreed to place on the agenda Peiping's complaints regarding alleged American bombing in Manchuria and to support a commission of investigation.

These moves do not constitute an outright withdrawal from the defense of Taiwan, but they do indicate a more conciliatory policy toward the Chinese Communists, who will probably be invited to send a delegation to Lake Success when the Taiwan question comes up for discussion. Meanwhile, the stock of the Kuomintang regime in Taipei has gone down, and its American supporters have begun to push this issue to the forefront in the election campaign.

Clearly, however, the danger of hostilities with the Chinese Communists and the desirability of strengthening our ties with the leaders of Asia, as typified by India's Pandit Nehru, have taken first priority as determining factors in American policy regarding Taiwan. Defense of the island and the Chinese Nationalists, while not renounced for the time being, has been reduced in importance.

Although considerable time may be consumed in debates over the status of Taiwan, and actions may be undertaken which will delay the date when Peiping can take over the island, in the long run the vast area and population of the China mainland weigh far more heavily in the scales of the world balance of power than the Formosan thorn in the flesh. This overriding reality will ultimately determine American policy regarding Taiwan.

FRED W. RIGGS

News in the Making

AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR UNITED EUROPE: In a move indicating stronger support by the dominions for British participation in European affairs, Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender said at a press conference in London on September 4 that Australia favors closer ties between Britain and the continent of Europe and expressed approval of a European army which would include British units. Hitherto Britain has contended that such ties would be opposed by the dominions.

MORE APARTHEID FOR SOUTH AFRICA: The segregation policy of Dr. Daniel F. Malan's Nationalist government in South Africa is expected to gain new emphasis as the result of his party's clean sweep of elections in Southwest Africa on August 30. The addition of six new Nationalist members in the lower house reduced Dr. Malan's reliance on Nicholaas Havenga's Afrikaner party, until now a moderating influence in the coalition cabinet. The "integration" of Southwest Africa, a League mandate, into the Union has embroiled South Africa with the UN.

BRITISH MACHINE TOOLS FOR RUSSIA: Heated controversy has stirred Britain since Opposition Leader Winston Churchill charged in a political broadcast on August 26 that the Labor government has condoned shipments of machine tools to Russia. Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee replied on September 2 that the shipments were made under the 1947 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement and therefore did not come under the ban applied by the government eighteen months ago.

NEW TROUBLE FOR THE BALKANS: New trouble is brewing in the Balkans where Bulgaria, relying on a 1925 pact with Turkey, early in August delivered a virtual ultimatum to Ankara demanding the reception within three months of some 250,000 Turkish residents of Bulgaria. Implementation of this demand would throw a heavy burden on the new Turkish government, and Communist agents might be introduced among the refugees. Bulgaria, for its part, would eliminate a substantial unassimilated minority.

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